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Abstract
Imitating the best strategy from the previous period has been shown to be an important
heuristic, in particular in relatively complex environments. In this experiment we test
whether subjects are more likely to use imitation if they are under stress. Subjects
play a repeated Cournot oligopoly. Treatments are time pressure within the task and
distractions through a second task (a Stroop-task) that has to be performed as well and
influences payment. We measure stress levels through salivary cortisol measurements
and through measuring the heart rate. Our main findings are that time pressure
and distraction can indeed raise physiological stress levels of subjects within our task.
More importantly from an economic perspective, we can also observe a corresponding
behavioral change that is indicative of imitation.
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1 Introduction
Economic decisions are often made under stress. Obvious examples are traders on financial
markets who are subject to extreme time pressure, cognitive load through multitasking,
and steep financial incentives. To a lesser degree, this is true for most professions: Decisions
often have to be taken under time pressure and with many distracting factors present.
There is a growing psychological literature on the eﬀects of stress on specific aspects of
decision making. Some of the key findings are that acute stress seems to impair strategic
thinking (see e.g. Leder et al., 2013). Stress also seems to inhibit learning from feedback
(Petzold et al., 2010; Starcke et al., 2008) and to shift learning processes from goal-directed
to habitual (Schwabe et al., 2012). Taken together, stress seems to impair deliberate
reasoning so that decisions are made in a more automated manner. Thus, under stress,
behavioral deviations from homo oeconomicus may be even more pronounced than usual.
One way of coping with stress may be for decision makers to employ simple heuristics
like imitation rather than cognitively demanding optimization. The simple heuristic of
imitating the best strategy from the previous period has a lot of appeal, in particular
in relatively complex environments. It has been shown theoretically to be a robust and
successful heuristic in many circumstances because it is diﬃcult to exploit by opponents
(see e.g. Duersch et al. 2012). Empirically, imitation turned out to describe fairly well
the behavior of many experimental subjects in complex strategic situations (see e.g. Huck
et al., 1999; Oﬀerman et al., 2002; Apesteguia et al., 2007, 2010). So the question arises
whether there is more imitation under stress.
In this experiment we test whether subjects are indeed more likely to use imitation
if they are under acute stress. Subjects play a repeated Cournot oligopoly. Rather than
inducing stress through some external task as in most psychological studies (e.g. using
the Trier Social Stress Test, Kirschbaum et al., 1993), in our experiment stress can arise
endogenously in the main task. Apart from a base treatment there are two treatments
that potentially raise stress levels: In treatment Time pressure subjects are fined if they
do not decide within a set time interval. In treatment Distraction a second task (a Stroop-
task) has to be performed concurrently inducing cognitive load. Arguably, both of these
manipulations are typical of modern workplace conditions with deadlines that have to be
met and distractions through email or phone calls that require immediate attention.
To check whether our manipulations work, we measure stress levels through salivary
cortisol and heart rate measurements. The release of stress-related hormones supports
1
the adaptation process of the organism to changes and can protect the body in the short
run. Under stress, cortisol for example redirects energy utilization among various organs.
It simultaneously amplifies energy mobilizing mechanisms and inhibits less relevant organ
functions. This helps to overcome the increased metabolic demand presented by a host of
challenges. Cortisol also impacts on other important physiological systems and exerts sig-
nificant eﬀects on brain areas involved in aﬀective and cognitive processes like declarative,
episodic, and short-term memory (for a meta-analytic review see Het et al., 2005). The free
fraction of cortisol, which can be measured in saliva, has been established as a biomarker
of psychological stress (for a recent review see Hellhammer et al., 2009). Stress exposure
also usually elicits temporary increases in heart rate and blood pressure (Kudielka et al.,
2004).
Our main findings are that time pressure and distraction can indeed raise physiological
stress levels of subjects within our task. More importantly from an economic perspective,
we can also observe a corresponding behavioral change that is indicative of imitation. In
particular, markets in our experiment become a lot more competitive under stress, a finding
that is compatible with more imitation (Vega-Redondo, 1997). When looking at individual
behavior, we find further direct evidence that subjects resort more to imitation when under
stress. For example, subjects use significantly more often the information about others’
actions and profits. Also, individual adjustments are on average more in line with imitation
than with best reply behavior.
In the next section we summarize the related literature. In Section 3 we describe the
details of our experiment. Section 4 reports the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
In this section we try to summarize the related literature from psychology and economics
on stress and decision making. Stress seems to increase risk taking (Starcke et al., 2008;
Putman et al., 2010; not however in von Dawans et al., 2012) as well as to have an eﬀect,
depending on gender, on the willingness to accept ambiguity (Van den Bos et al., 2009;
Preston et al., 2007; Lighthall et al., 2009). Furthermore, Leder et al. (2013) find first
evidence that stress may inhibit strategic thinking. In their study, stressed participants
showed lower levels of strategic reasoning, probably due to less deliberate reasoning under
stress. Indeed, other studies also suggest a shift from deliberate to more automated thinking
styles under stress. Kassam et al. (2009), for example, report less adjustment in an
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anchoring-and-adjustment task for stressed participants. Porcelli and Delgado (2009) found
that the reflection bias, i.e. risk taking for losses but risk avoidance for gains (cf. Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), was more pronounced under stress.
However, from a behavioral economics point of view, the above-reviewed results re-
garding how stress influences decision making are limited in several ways. Most of the
psychological studies of stress and decision making so far used hypothetical situations or
situations with very low incentives (with the exception of von Dawans et al., 2012). This is
unfortunate, as it has been shown in several studies that incentives do matter (for a review
see Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). Most importantly in this respect, many decision mak-
ing “anomalies” or “biases” disappear when subjects are strongly motivated by monetary
incentives. The finding that stressed subjects take suboptimal decisions and learn slower
from feedback in hypothetical situations might simply reflect the fact that under stress,
resources are used for the more important task at hand, i.e., for coping with the stressor.
It would therefore be desirable to study decision making under stressful conditions in situ-
ations where performance in the experimental task is at least as important for subjects as
handling the stressor.
Previous studies investigating economic decision making under time pressure found
evidence for altered behavior (Maule et al., 2000; Kocher et al., 2013; Cappelletti, 2011;
Sutter et al., 2003; Kocher and Sutter, 2006; Rieskamp and Hoﬀrage, 2008; Ibanez et
al., 2009; Reutskaja et al., 2011). Most importantly, depth of reasoning decreases under
time pressure (Kocher and Sutter, 2006) and information processing is altered so that less
information is searched and integrated (Rieskamp and Hoﬀrage, 2008). Time pressure also
seems to increase cooperation in public goods games (cf. Rand et al., 2012 but also Tinghög
et al., 2013).
Similarly, decision making seems to be aﬀected by cognitive load. Cognitive load is
usually induced by applying a second task that has to be worked on in parallel to the
decision task. According to dual process models, this should lead to impaired deliberative
processing as the deliberative system relies on scarce processing resources. Therefore,
decision making should become more automatic. Indeed, Duﬀy and Smith (2011) (see also
Allred et al., 2013) report less strategic behavior in a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma under
high cognitive load compared to low cognitive load. Other studies manipulating cognitive
load also report altered behavior in delay discounting tasks (Franco-Watkins et al., 2010;
Hinson et al., 2003) as well as risk tasks (Benjamin et al., 2013; Hinson et al., 2002) and
social games like the dictator game (Hauge et al., 2009). Yet, Cappelletti et al. (2011)
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only found evidence for altered behavior in an ultimatum game under time pressure, not
under cognitive load.
Both, cognitive load and time pressure are often used as stressors that can be applied
at the same time as the task on which stress eﬀects are investigated, in contrast to external
stress induction protocols that have to be performed before the task of interest. Therefore,
cognitive load and time pressure might be seen as more realistic stressors in an economic
decision making context. Demanding cognitive tasks like the Stroop task (1935) or mental
arithmetic tasks have been shown to be able to elicit a hormonal stress response (Dickerson
and Kemeny, 2004). Yet, it is not known if time pressure also elicits physiological stress
reactions. Therefore, we monitored heart rate and changes of the stress hormone cortisol
throughout our study.
3 Experimental design
In a series of computerised experiments we studied a homogenous multi—period Cournot
market with linear demand and cost. There were three symmetric firms in each market.
Quantities could be chosen as integers between 0 and 100. The demand side of the market
was modelled with the computer buying all supplied units according to the inverse demand
function
 = max{100− 0} (1)
with  = P3=1  denoting total quantity in period . The cost function for each seller
was simply () =   Hence, profits were  = ( − 1) 
In the stage game the symmetric Cournot Nash equilibrium for our integer strategy
set is given by  = 25  ∈  yielding a price of  = 25 and profit of Π = 600.1
Of interest is also the symmetric Walrasian (or competitive) outcome where price equals
marginal cost,  = 1,  = (100− 1) 3 = 33  ∈  and the profit is zero The symmetric
collusive or joint profit maximizing outcome would be at  = 16  ∈  or  = 17with
a corresponding price of  = 52 or 49 and a profit of Π = 816
The stage game was played with fixed matching for 15 periods and this was commonly
known. After each market period subjects were informed about their personal profits.
Additionally, they were reminded of their own quantity.
1There is also an asymmetric equilibrium, in which one firm chooses 24 and the other two choose 25.
Profits in this equilibrium are 600 and 625, respectively.
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Table 1: Theoretical benchmarks
Outcomes Individual quantities Prices Profits
Collusion 16/17 52/49 816
Cournot—Nash 25 25 600
Walrasian / Imitation 33 1 0
In round 1, all subjects had access to a profit calculator, which allowed to input hypo-
thetical quantities for all three firms and would calculate the respective profits. At the end
of rounds 1 through 14, subjects had to choose whether in the next round they would like to
again use the profit calculator or whether they would receive information about the profits
and quantities of the other two firms.2 Obviously, the first choice would be indicative of
an interest in best reply behavior while the second would provide the necessary feedback
for imitation to work.3
Table 2 summarizes the three treatments of our experiment. Treatment Base is the
standard oligopoly experiment with the feedback choice as explained in the previous para-
graph. Subjects were paid according to their total profits from all rounds. Profits where
denominated in ‘Taler’, the exchange rate for euro (600:1 in treatments Base and Time
pressure and 1000:1 in treatment Distraction) was known. Additionally, subjects received
a show-up fee of 5 euro.
Treatment Time pressure was like Base except that subjects had to make their quantity
choices within a set decision time. In round 1 there was no time pressure. For round 2,
the decision time was 40 seconds, which was calibrated to roughly 2/3 of median response
time in Base from rounds 2 through 5. Since the response times in Base were decreasing
throughout the experiment, we reduced the decision times by 2 seconds every period so
that it was 14 seconds in the last period in order to keep the time pressure up. The screen
showed a large clock counting down the seconds. There was a penalty of 300 Taler (about
half of the Nash equilibrium profit) for not entering a quantity in time. If subjects failed
to enter a new quantity, the quantity from the previous period was used again to calculate
profits.
Treatment Distraction was like Base except that in irregular intervals subjects had to
2Bigoni (2010) and Bigoni and Fort (2013) also recorded the look-up patterns of subjects with respect
to the information they acquired. In their experiments, though, subjects did not have to make an exclusive
choice among the information accessed. Rather, subjects could see all information in each round.
3Strictly speaking, subjects could only infer the best response from the previous period’s price as they
were not informed about the individual quantities.
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Table 2: Treatments
Base standard oligopoly experiment
from round 2: shrinking decision time 40, 38, 36, 34,. . . ,14 sec.
Time pressure penalty of 300 T (~half Nash-eq. profit) if no decision
countdown prominently shown on screen
Distraction in irregular intervals: pop-up Stroop-task, 1-2 sec.
payoﬀ: (1+ fraction correct in Stroop) (payoﬀ from main task)
perform a Stroop-task. The task popped up on the screen and subjects had between 1-2
seconds to answer. The task (Stroop, 1935) was a multiple choice task where subjects had
to name the font color of a word like “Green” or “Red” where usually the font color and the
meaning of the word diﬀered. The Stroop tasks kept popping up until the last subject of a
group had entered a quantity for the oligopoly task. Subjects’ overall payoﬀ was calculated
as (1+ fraction of correct answers in the Stroop task) times the payoﬀ from the oligopoly
task.
The experiments were conducted in the experimental lab of the economics department
of the University of Heidelberg. Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and
flyers from all over the campus.
In each session either 6 or 9 subjects participated. All sessions were conducted at
the same time of day (2:30 p.m.) since cortisol levels typically follow a daily cycle. The
experiment was computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were randomly
allocated to computer terminals in the lab such that they could not infer with whom they
would interact in a fixed group of three. For each treatment we had seven independent
groups of subjects — making a total of 3 × 7 × 3 = 63 subjects who participated in the
experiments. All subjects were male and healthy students.
The average payoﬀ was about 14 euro. Experiments lasted about 60 minutes including
instruction time. Instructions (see Appendix A) were written on paper and distributed at
the beginning of each session.
3.1 Physiological measures
To check whether our manipulations worked, we collected physiological measures before,
during, and after the experiment. As explained above, the free fraction of cortisol, which
can be measured in saliva, has been established as a biomarker of psychological stress
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(Hellhammer et al., 2009). Also, a temporary increases in heart rate is usually seen as a
signal of stress exposure (Kudielka et al., 2004).
• Cortisol. Saliva samples were collected at three time points throughout the experi-
ment using Salivette collection devices (Sarsted, Nuembrecht, Germany): one at the
start of the experiment (pre-stress), one after 8 rounds of the game had been played
(during stress, approximately 15 minutes after stressor onset), and one after the last
round (post-stress, approximately 30 minutes after stressor onset).4 As the cortisol
reaction is relatively slow, the cortisol peak is expected between 15 and 25 minutes
after stressor onset. The number of observations was 21 for treatments Base and
Time pressure. For treatment Distraction only 6 observations were available for the
2nd measurement and 20 for the 3rd.5
• Heart rate. Heart rate was measured continuously using Polar Sport Tester RS800CX
(Polar Electro, Finland). Each participant was equipped with a breast belt and a
display similar to a wrist watch was placed on the table invisible for the participant.
For analysis, the Polar Pro Trainer software was used. Data were aggregated into
three intervals: baseline (5 min.), part 1 of the game (round 1 through 8), and part
2 of the game (rounds 9 through 15). In between part 1 and part 2 of the game, a
salivary cortisol measurement took part (see above). For some subjects data were
not available due to hardware failures. The number of remaining observations were
18, 17, and 13, for treatments Base, Time pressure, and Distraction, respectively.
4 Results
4.1 Physiological data
Since cortisol levels and heart rates can vary greatly between individuals, we normalize all
values by dividing through the first measurement of each subject at the beginning of the
experiment, before subjects learned anything about the experiment. That is, all physiologi-
cal measures are shown as ratios1 where  = 2 3 are the 2nd and 3rd measurements,
4The peak of the cortisol reaction seems to be roughly 15-20 min. after stressor onset (see e.g. Pabst et
al., 2013).
5 In session 8 and 9 of treatment Distraction subjects were so slow such that round 8 (when we usually
conducted the second measurement) occurred at the time at which the third measurement was taking place
in the remaining sessions. We therefore take this measure as equivalent to the third measure in the other
treatments (and have missing data for the second measure).
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respectively. Figure 1 compares the averages of these ratios for cortisol and heart rate for
the diﬀerent treatments. Usually, cortisol levels decrease in the afternoon (Engert et al.,
2011), the time of the experiments. In treatment Base we have a slight decrease at the
third measurement. In contrast, in treatment Time pressure cortisol ratios are higher at the
2nd and 3rd measurements. The diﬀerences to treatment Base are significant (MWU-test,
 = 0058 and  = 0013 for the second and third measurement, respectively). There are
no significant diﬀerences between treatments Distraction and Base for the second measure-
ment. However, for the third measurement, the cortisol ratio in Distraction is significantly
higher than in Base (MWU-test,  = 0060).
Figure 1 (bottom panel) shows the average development of heart rates. Although
heart rate ratios in treatments Time pressure and Distraction are higher than in Base, the
diﬀerences are not significant according to MWU-tests.
Result 1 Time pressure and, to a lesser extent, a Stroop task seem to increase stress levels
as measured by cortisol.
4.2 Behavioral data
In the end, what is relevant for economics are the behavioral outcomes. Figure 2 shows
the average (net) profits per period aggregated over all subjects in a treatment. Only
profits from the oligopoly game are shown (i.e. without payments for the Stroop task and
penalties for exceeding the time limit). Recall that the Nash equilibrium prediction is a
profit of 600. As expected from the previous literature (Huck et al., 1999, Oﬀerman et al.,
2002, and Apesteguia et al., 2007) we find that already in treatment Base profits (average
profit per round = 5160) are lower than predicted by the Nash equilibrium (although this
diﬀerence is not significant: Wilcoxon test,  = 0128, two-sided, taking the average profit
from each group as one independent observation). But Figure 2 shows that the profits in
treatment Time pressure (351.6) and Distraction (361.4) are lower still. The diﬀerences to
Base are significant according to a MWU-test ( = 0048 for Time pressure vs. Base and
 = 0025 for Distraction vs. Base).
Result 2 Net profits in the oligopoly game (i.e. profits without punishment in Time pres-
sure and payments for Stroop task) in treatments Time pressure and Distraction are sig-
nificantly lower than in Base.
8
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1st 2nd 3rd
Cortisol
base
time pressure
distraction
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1st 2nd 3rd
Heart rate
base
time pressure
distraction
Figure 1: Average cortisol (top panel) and heart rate ratios (bottom panel) of subjects
across treatments.
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Figure 2: Average profits of subjects in the diﬀerent treatments compared to the Nash
equilibrium profit.
Note: Profits are net of payments for the Stroop taks and penalities for exceeding the time limit.
4.3 More imitation under stress?
Just because the aggregate outcomes are more competitive in treatments Time pressure
and Distraction one cannot immediately conclude that there is more imitation under stress.
A second indication comes from the feedback choices of subjects. Recall that imitation
requires knowledge about the quantity and profits of the other firms in the market. But
there is a trade-oﬀ: When subjects opt to receive information on quantities and profits of
others, they have to give up the option of using the profit calculator in the next round.
Since the profit calculator is (for most people) essential for employing any belief based
learning process, we can infer something about the learning process subjects use.
Figure 3 shows the percentage of subjects requesting the two forms of feedback, split
by treatment and period. Overall it is striking how large the percentage of subjects is
that request information about others’ quantities and profits (blue bars). However, while
in treatment Base there are about 20% of subjects using the profit calculator in the first
half of the experiment, there are much fewer in the other two treatments. In fact, these
diﬀerences are significant according to MWU-tests (two-sided  = 0017 and  = 0010
for the diﬀerence between Base and Time pressure and between Base and Distraction,
respectively, taking the average from each oligopoly as one observation).
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Figure 3: Feedback choice of subjects in %: Green = choice of profit calculator, blue =
choice to see quantities and profits of others.
Result 3 Subjects use significantly more often the information about others’ actions and
profits in treatment Time pressure and Distraction than in treatment Base.
A possible objection is that under time pressure subjects do not even have the time
to use the profit calculator. Although this may be true to some extent in treatment Time
pressure, subjects have no time pressure in Treatment Distraction. They also did not try
to speed up their quantity decisions in order to be able to focus solely on the Stroop task.
In fact, they took more time than in the base treatment (see Figure 4, which shows the
median decision times for the diﬀerent treatments).
For the remainder of the section we shall focus on individual behavior since this is the
most demanding test for checking whether subjects actually use imitation. First, we simply
count the number of times in which a subject chose exactly the quantity that yielded the
highest profit in the previous round. We call this an “imitation instance”. Table 3 lists
the percentage of all quantity choices that were imitation instances, separately for each
treatment. The second row in Table 3 lists the percentage of choices that were within ±3
of the quantity that yielded the highest profit in the previous round. A 2-test shows for
either measure that imitation instances are more frequent in treatment Time pressure than
in Base or Distraction (  001 for all tests) whereas there is no significant diﬀerence
between Base and Distraction.
Result 4 The frequency of imitation instances in treatment Time pressure is significantly
higher than in treatments Base and Distraction.
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Figure 4: Median decision times (in seconds) of subjects for the quantity decision
Table 3: Imitation instances
Base Time pressure Distraction
imitation instances 10.2% 21.7% 13.3%
imitation instances ±3 32.7% 48.4% 36.1%
Note: Periods in which subjects were forced to repeat their action due to exceeding the time limit were not
counted.
12
We suspect that subjects often show a certain kind of inertia and adjust their quantities
incompletely from their current status quo (−1 ) towards a new goal. To check whether
this new goal is more in line with a prediction derived from an imitation rule or derived
from a best reply process, we estimate the following equation using a random eﬀects GLS
regression:
 − −1 = 0 + 1
¡−1 − −1 ¢+ 2 ¡−1 − −1 ¢+  (2)
where −1 denotes subject ’s best reply (i.e. reaction function) given the other firms’
quantities in − 1; −1 stands for “imitate the best” and denotes the quantity of the firm
which had the highest profit in period  − 1. If all subjects strictly played a myopic best
reply every period, we would have 1 = 1 and 2 = 0. Analogously, if all subjects strictly
followed the rule “imitate the best”, we would find 1 = 0 and 2 = 1.
Table 4: Quantity adjustments: Random eﬀect regression
dependent variable: Base Time pressure Distraction
 − −1 coeﬀ. std. error coeﬀ. std. error coeﬀ. std. error
−1 − −1 0.24∗∗∗ 0.04 0.14∗∗ 0.06 0.18∗∗∗ 0.03−1 − −1 039∗∗∗ 009 048∗∗∗ 017 0.41∗∗∗ 0.06
constant −116∗∗∗ 039 000 132 0.47 0.81
2 0.45 0.46 0.45
Note: ∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level;  = 294 Robust standard errors are clustered at
the group level.
As shown in Table 4, the coeﬃcients of both variables are highly significant in all treat-
ments.6 So it seems that there is a mix of the two learning processes, which is consistent
with earlier findings (see e.g. Huck et al., 1999 or Bigoni and Fort, 2013). However, there
are noticeable diﬀerences across treatments with respect to the size of the coeﬃcients.
While the coeﬃcient for the imitation process is larger in all treatments, the diﬀerence
is particularly pronounced in treatment Time pressure and less so in treatment Base. As
before, treatment Distraction is somewhere in between.
Result 5 Individual adjustments are on average more in line with imitation than with
best reply behavior. This tendency is more pronounced in treatment Time pressure than in
Base.
6Running the regression jointly for all treatments with treatment dummies and interaction terms shows
that there are no significant treatment diﬀerences in the learning dynamics.
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Finally, we check whether the tendency to imitate may actually be related to the stress
levels of individuals. For this, we run a logit regression on the probability of an imitation
instance ±3 depending on the normalized cortisol and heart rate measurements.7
Table 5: Probability of imitating: Logit regression
dependent variable: (1) (2)
imitation instance ±3 coeﬀ. std. error coeﬀ. std. error
cortisol 3rd measurement ratio 0.37∗ 0.19 0.27∗ 0.14
heart rate 2nd measurement ratio 287∗∗ 138 2.31∗ 1.28
constant −376∗∗∗ 137 −323∗∗∗ 1.22
dummy treatment Time pressure — 0.32 0.28
dummy treatment Distraction — 003 0.32
pseudo 2 0.02 0.02
Note: ∗∗∗∗∗ ∗ significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level;  = 661Robust standard errors are clustered at the
group level.
Table 5 shows the result of two of those logit regressions, once with treatment dummies
and once without. The treatment dummies are not significant. In both specifications higher
cortisol and heart rates are associated with a higher probability to imitate, although some
of the results are only weakly significant at the 10% level.
Result 6 Individuals’ probabilities to imitate are increasing with their cortisol and heart
rate values.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the question whether subjects tend to imitate others more
if they are under stress. To induce stress, we used two stressors that are quite typical
of economic decision making, time pressure and distraction through another task. Our
experimental data supports the hypothesis that stress leads to more imitation. To be
precise, what we showed is that time pressure and distraction yielded physiological reactions
that are typically associated with stress, namely higher cortisol levels and, to some degree,
higher heart rates. We also showed that at the same time, time pressure and distraction
yielded behavior that is typical of imitation
7We use 3rd measurements for cortisol and 2nd measurements for heart rates since heart rates react
instantly while cortisol reacts with delay (see e.g. Pabst et al., 2013). Using 3rd measurements for heart
rates yields results that are actually significant at the 5% level.
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What we are not able to conclude is that there are direct causal links from time pressure
or distraction to stress and from stress to imitation. This is for two reasons. First, it is
unclear how to define stress precisely. Some researchers define stress to be an increase in
cortisol or other physiological measures while others define stress according to behavioral
features (see e.g. Levine, 1985). Secondly, it may well be possible that time pressure and
distraction influence physiological measures and at the same time increase the tendency to
imitate without stress being causal for imitation. An interesting test would be to check
whether the administration of cortisol by itself would increase the tendency to imitate
The evidence from other tasks seems mixed. For example, Kirschbaum et al. (1996) find
that treatment-induced elevations of cortisol levels are associated with impaired declarative
memory whereas the administration of cortisol is not. On the other hand, Putman et al.
(2010) find that the administration of cortisol does increase risk taking behavior.
From an economist’s perspective, however, it may be fully suﬃcient to conclude that
imitation is more frequent under time pressure and distraction. Whether we call this stress
or not is secondary. But the behavioral eﬀects are clear: The tendency to imitate increases
when subjects are pressed for time or when they are distracted by another task. And this
in turn yields more competitive outcomes.
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Appendix
A Instructions
[English translation of the German instructions, diﬀerences between treatments are indi-
cated]
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully.
In this experiment we want to gather a number of biological parameters in a situation
of economic decision making. Before being assigned an economic task, you will receive a
heart rate monitor consisting of a breast strap and a wrist watch that you will wear for
the duration of the experiment. To determine certain hormone levels, we will take saliva
samples several times during the experiment. The experimenter will explain in detail the
procedure when collecting a saliva sample using a salivette (i.e., a small cotton roll which
you will have to chew for a short time). The experiment will take approx. 90 minutes.
Rules of the economic experiment: You will have to make several decisions on the
computer. In the process, you can earn real money. But first of all, please note:
Be absolutely quiet for the whole duration of the experiment. Participants ignoring
this rule cannot be paid. If you have any question, raise your hand, and someone will come
over.
You will receive your payoﬀ individually and discreetly right at the end of the experi-
ment.
The experiment’s payoﬀs will be calculated in Taler (T). At the end of the experiment
your payoﬀs will be converted into euros, with 600 T = 1 euro.
The experiment comprises 15 rounds.
During the whole experiment you will be interacting with two participants in this
room. These two participants will stay here over the 15 rounds. No one will learn as to
who interacted with whom.
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Each of you represents a firm that produces and sells a product. So there are, in
addition to you, two competitors who produce and sell the same product. The production
costs are 1 T per unit (for all firms). Your task is to make a decision on how many units
you want to sell of your product.
The following important rule applies: The higher the total quantity produced by all
three firms, the lower the market price. Above a certain quantity the price becomes zero.
The profit per unit is the diﬀerence between the price and the unit cost (1 T). Note
that you will suﬀer a loss if the price falls below the unit cost. Your profit in this round is
calculated as profit per unit multiplied with the number of units sold by you.
At the end all profits realized during the rounds will be added and paid.
Starting from the second round you will receive the following information in each round:
Your own quantity and the resulting profit of the previous round.
Moreover, you can choose between two options to receive additional information:
a) Display the quantities and profits that the two other firms realized in the previous
round.
b) Use the profit calculator. There you can enter hypothetical quantities for all three
firms and obtain the resulting profits of the firms.
In each round you can choose only one of the two options. But you can make your
choice in each individual round.
[This paragraph for treatment Time pressure only] In the first round there is no time
limit for your decision. But starting from the second round on you must make your decisions
concerning the quantity and the choice of feedback option within a certain time interval.
This time interval is 40 seconds in the 2nd round. It will be reduced by 2 seconds for each
subsequent round, so that you will have 14 seconds in the 15th (final) round. The time
interval available for each round will be displayed as a big „countdown“ on the screen. If
you fail to make a decision within this interval, you must pay a 300 T fine for this round.
Also, the quantity you selected in the previous round will be selected automatically for this
round.
[This paragraph for treatment Distraction only] In addition to this task you must
execute, starting from round 2, a color recognition task at irregular times. For this task
you will be shown words whose font colors are either green, blue, black, red, or yellow.
Your task is to recognize the font color and then to click the associated color field. Ignore
the meaning of the word and only concentrate on the font color! You must proceed quickly
because you have only 1-2 seconds per task. If you select no color at all or a wrong color, the
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result of the color recognition task will be marked as wrong. Assume that the proportion
of correct questions of the color recognition task is . Then, at the end, you will get the
total profits over all rounds of the first task, multiplied with (1 + ). This will be your
payoﬀ for the entire experiment. For example, if you have answered 80% of the questions
in the color recognition task correctly, your payoﬀ for the experiment is:
(1 + 08)× (total profit over all rounds of the first task).
To achieve an overall high payoﬀ, you have to perform well in both tasks.
[all treatments] Everything described above applies not only to you but also to the two
other firms. All three of you are reading exactly the same instructions.
Have fun!
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